WHY POPULISTS ARE WINNING

and How to Beat Them

ALSO BY LIAM BYRNE

Turning to Face the East

Black Flag Down

Dragons

The Inequality of Wealth

WHY POPULISTS ARE WINNING

and How to Beat Them

Liam Byrne



An Apollo Book

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To democrats, everywhere

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1

The Age of Rage

It was not a winter of discontent. It was a boiling summer. Up and down a sun-burnt England, the red-and-white flags of St George were cable-tied to lamp-posts in an angry campaign to 'raise the colours'. Outside non-descript hotels, riot police locked arms, struggling to hold the line against crowds hell-bent on storming shelters for asylum-seekers. And in the papers – papers that once prided themselves on nuance and judgement – editors recast bigotry as bravery and gave star billing to a woman convicted of urging the immolation of foreigners.

But 2025 wasn't just a British fever dream.

Across the Channel, France's far right marched with thousands to celebrate their strongest showing in a generation. In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) muscled its way into second place in the polls. In Austria, a party founded by a former SS officer no longer skulked in the shadows – it was the largest force in parliament. From Rome to Budapest to Warsaw, nationalist movements were no longer shouting in the streets – they were taking office and wielding power. Meanwhile in Washington, the new President was ordering the National

Guard – complete with flak jackets and automatic weapons – onto the streets of the capital.

Some 2 billion people went to vote in 2024. It was democracy's biggest year. By the time the votes were counted, results declared and oaths of office sworn, one thing was crystal clear: populism had reached a new high-water mark. Yet is this peak populism? Or populism's tipping point? In the polls its parties are soaring. In the media, its myths are normalised. In office, its leaders have evolved from the political 'improv' of their early days in office to a well-defined political project.

All told, populists now lead one-quarter of the planet's democracies.[1] Authoritarian populists lead governments in Hungary, Italy and Slovakia and hold cabinet seats in six EU countries.[2] In nine more, they're either topping the polls or propping up ruling coalitions.[3] On 1 June 2024, Poland's Karol Nawrocki – backed by the populist Law and Justice Party – clinched the presidency by a razor-thin margin. In Britain's 2024 general election, Reform became the most electorally successful far-right formation in modern British history.[4] As I write this now in the House of Commons Library, Reform bests the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives in the polls. But no election was as consequential as the re-election of President Trump. When Donald Trump stormed back into the White House in 2024, he didn't ride a wave of admiration. He surfed a tide of fury. The Democrats, for all their data and dollars, failed to grasp the depth of American rage. And the populists won because he did.

The danger we must now confront is that populists could, and might, push through this tipping point: seizing the hard power of office and the soft power of the agenda

across the West when history itself is turning. For the three great trends that created the politics of today – like waves racing into shore – are growing stronger. And the inevitable crisis, the trigger, may tip us into new and darker times.

Populism has the maddening quality of being easy to spot but hard to define. A bit like pornography, you know it when you see it. Political scientists like the simple, broad definition of Dutch scholar Cas Mudde. He describes populism as 'a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite" '. And politics, insist the populists, 'should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people'.[5]

Yet today's radical right-wing populists offer far more than this. They are authoritarian populists.[6] They advance an 'us v. them' politics thin in theory but in practice thick with menace: a stew of tribalism, nostalgia, nativism and authoritarianism stirred into a potent political project. It's soaked in the brandy of nostalgia with a saccharine appeal to a lost past. It combines a *cri de cœur* to 'restore the nation' in a 'moral panic' at what's billed as a civilisational struggle against elites within and foreigners without. Its appeal is a simple trick: to tell people their anger at a rigged system is justified – but then to redirect that anger towards a different target. Not just the elite but the outsider: the migrant, the minority. And the prescription? It is the prescription of every extremist down the ages; a strong man to stop the rot.

What populism is not, is new. The historian Eric Hobsbawm once described the nineteenth-century Luddites and their attacks on new industrial machines

as 'collective bargaining by riot'.[7] Populism is something similar. It is what rebellion looks like in a democracy. That is why it has surfaced whenever democracies have faltered – from the Narodniks in tsarist Russia to the Chartists in Victorian Britain, to the People's Party on the American plains, to the Poujadists of post-war France. But modern authoritarian populism is different in one crucial respect: it rises not from a single grievance but from the crushing weight of economic disappointment and digital division combined with the cultural anxiety that comes with collapsing social trust and evaporating social capital. Which is why it has accelerated since the Great Financial Crisis, as three great trends – the great disillusion, the great division and the new age of human movement – have all grown stronger and stronger. Together these seismic forces have triggered an earthquake.

The great disillusion

First came the great disillusion. The global economy, built after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has handed extraordinary riches to a lucky few. Yet for billions it is now failing. Generation after generation is now worse off than its parents and grandparents. Disillusioned that anything might change, more are losing faith in the virtues of democracy.

The global financial crisis of 2008 was a watershed. Before it, populists struggled. After it, populists grew stronger. It is often said that populism gained appeal because voters 'blamed' elites for causing the crash. But in truth the real anger was with the failure to fix the aftermath. Too many

governments offered austerity at home and drift abroad: a lost decade unfolded in which living standards flat-lined, the debt burdens grew heavier and hope drained away.[8]

Look at the figures. The Western promise was supposed to be that free societies grew faster. But that is not what's happened since 2010. In fact, between 2010 and 2025 the economies of the countries around the world counted as 'free' grew on average a fifth less than the countries classed as dictatorships.[9]

This great broken promise helps explain why old loyalties to the mainstream political parties, forged in the Big Bang of nineteenth-century democracy, had atrophied to mere weak affinities. The collapse of confidence is now so pronounced that turnout everywhere is in free-fall – governments find themselves 'ruling the void' where lively consent should flourish. And in the void, bitterness now boils.

I have seen it first hand. For the last 20 years, I've run residents' meetings and gazebo surgeries every month in my constituency in East Birmingham. In those church halls, community centres and on windy street corners, I've heard the anger rise like a pot coming to the boil; the chronic pressure on living standards, the loss of pride in place as decline sets in, the pessimism about the future, the sense of dispossession triggered by immigration – and above all the rage at broken politics.

The great division

These challenges would be difficult to manage at any time. But a second force now drives the tidal waves in politics.

Drama and democracy are as old as ancient Greece. They emerged together in Athens as essential companions. Drama showcased the conflicts and dilemmas of the day, from which democracy sought to find the reconciliations and compromise which might allow a community to live a good life and flourish. But today, the digital revolution has created vast new squares and boulevards online through which the angry now march and shout in a cacophony that roils the daily debate, frustrating efforts to 'meet in the middle' and renew the coherent amity on which democracy ultimately rests. And it is getting worse.

A decade ago, I visited Scotland Yard, where high up in the old towers was a long, hot, cavernous room that was home to one of Britain's most important teams fighting against extremism. The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) was a tiny team of young police officers tasked with taking down extremist content whenever and wherever it is found.

Sealed off behind heavy signal-jamming doors, the room looked like a call centre; crammed desks overloaded with gigantic computer screens over which hung laminated signs showing the insignia of the extremists marked out as the operators' targets. These young officers were the best of British policing: full of practical wisdom and good, old-fashioned common sense, blessed with bonhomie and determination, patriotic to the core. They felt like they were winning. But ten years on, the battle against online extremism is all but lost – and the result is a West even more divided than before.

In 2025, the Pew global survey found that on average 72 per cent of adults across 25 nations considered the spread of false information online as a major threat to their country.[10]

It's now the number-one threat cited in most major Western countries. So it is no surprise that data now onfirms that social trust has eroded sharply in America and remains deeply stratified by class, race and age across rich democracies. In survey after survey, younger, poorer and more precarious citizens are less likely to say that 'most people can be trusted'. And supporters of populist parties are the least trusting of all. Where trust drains and the ties between us weaken, so the restraints on extremism wither – and populism spreads.

Britain is not immune to this. Research from King's College London shows Brits believe the country is now more divided than at any time since tracking began.[11] Eighty-four per cent of the public say the country feels divided. The belief that we are split by 'culture wars' has shot up from 46 per cent in 2020 to 67 per cent in 2025. Half the public now believe British culture is changing too fast. Nearly half say the country was better in the past – and even young people are now nostalgic; almost a third of 16–24-year-olds agree that 'I would like my country to be the way it used to be'.

Someone who has studied this deeply is Professor Bobby Duffy, former research director at Ipsos MORI and now head of the Policy Institute at King's College. He explained the importance of these new findings: 'Rhetoric does seem to matter – and it's very clear that it has become more extreme. Views that would have been moderated and taken down from social-media platforms a year or two ago no longer are. There is increasingly solid academic evidence for what we can all see in our own experience of platforms and politics – that our information environment has become more extreme and divisive. And there is very solid evidence that exposure to those

extreme views does shift individual attitudes and moves the social norm.'

Joined together, the Great Disillusion and the Great Division deepen the shock of the third great change of our era: the large-scale movement of people.

The new age of human movement

Nobody forgets their first visit to a refugee camp. As I walked through the Baharka camp in northwest Iraq, the air thick with dust and diesel, I looked out over the tents pitched in ragged lines. Amongst the ruin of lives, children did what children do everywhere. Little boys in wellies and flip-flops were pushing plastic trucks through the mud, building small worlds of their own. Their friends were chasing a half-flat football across a stony pitch, Barcelona FC tops hanging off narrow shoulders, while teenagers hung around inventing ways to fend off the boredom.

Here a young father, Ahmed, described what it was like carrying his five children through the mountains, all under nine. Refugee camps teach you some simple truths. Our indomitable will to survive will drive us to the most extraordinary extremes in search of the quiet miracle of a normal life – especially to keep our children safe, which is why half the residents of most camps are kids. Those who end up in camps are those who have lost literally everything. But those who can scrape together something – anything – will keep moving, by any means necessary.

Across the world, people are being driven from their homes by conflict, crushing poverty and climate change. According

to the World Bank,[12] refugee numbers have doubled in a decade. But the much larger story is the economic migration driven by Western nations' need for labour. So while the *share* of migrants in the global population has remained relatively stable since 1960, *absolute numbers* have grown. In high-income countries, the World Bank reports, 'global migration increased more than three times faster than population growth'. In an age marked by division and frustration, a change of this magnitude could hardly fail to have a political consequence.

Things can only get better?

When I worked for Tony Blair in 1996, the campaign anthem was, famously, D:Ream's hit single 'Things Can Only Get Better'. I have now been in public life long enough to know that, however bad things are, they can always get worse. And if we look ahead, it is not hard to spot the risks that might take populism through the tipping point to control the mainstream, not because mainstream leaders are feeble, but because the storms are fierce. For these three great trends, the great disillusion, the great division and the the new age of movement, are unlikely to abate in the years to come. They will grow stronger.

The great disillusion may grow deeper as artificial intelligence wipes out millions of jobs. The IMF already warns that up to 60 per cent of jobs may be affected. Potentially half of advanced nations may experience reduced labour demand, downward pressure on wages or a jobs wipe-out,[13] which may accelerate countries' retreat into the beggar-thy-neighbour economics of the 1930s. The great division may grow deeper and more dangerous as social media grows

its audience and new technology of AI-driven deep-fakes renders it finally impossible to discern fact from fiction. Meanwhile, human movement may accelerate. As the President of the World Bank often explains, over the next decade or two, some 1.2 billion young people are about to enter the labour market across emerging economies. But the best-case scenarios are that anywhere between 200 million and 600 million will be left without jobs. In the search for hope, many will move to the countries of Europe and America, where ageing societies urgently need younger workers to maintain their economic dynamism.

If they are badly managed, these long-running trends will provide populists with plenty of firewood. But in politics, you need a real crisis to truly change the political weather. An economic crisis, like a financial meltdown from which the now debt-laden West may lack the capacity to respond, could enable populists to seize even more power. This is no fanciful scenario. It's the expectation of many in the markets.

The trigger

The famous Beaux-Arts façade of the New York Stock Exchange looks out not onto Wall Street but Broad Street. With its Corinthian columns, its Greek pediment crowded with allegorical figures, its huge American flags stirring in the canyoned light, it is a modern temple built with marble calm to reassure a risky business. But step inside and you're hit with a flash-bang charge of testosterone, adrenaline and data.

On the spotless, bustling trading floor – a grand arena lit like a film set – banks of screens crowd the space. Numbers,

news and logos race across walls of digital colour while live TV commentators in their broadcast booths mix with traders buying and selling stocks and stories.

I arrived one Friday afternoon – 17 May 2024, to be precise – with my committee for a tour. As five o'clock approached, we gathered beneath the balcony of the NYSE Board Room, where on its perch was the brass bell that rings out the end of the trading week. We could feel the anticipation rise. The bell sounded with a bright clang that cut through the noise. Up went the cheers. Applause rolled across the floor. And then the number flashed: the Dow Jones had closed above 40,000 for the first time in history – 40,003.59. The mood was buoyant, almost oblivious. Whatever storms were gathering, Wall Street had hit a record. The market has been rising ever since. Which is exactly why some people are getting very worried.

Markets tend to crash when everyone is happy to think nothing can go wrong. In 1929, Wall Street believed the party could last for ever. In 2008, the banks convinced themselves that housing prices would only ever go up – until the bubble burst. Today, markets seem convinced that once again 'this time it is different' and the dizzying advance of new technology justifies the exuberance that is sending indexes to new heights. In fact we stand once more on the edge of a precipice. Why? Because the bond between economic rationality and political rationality has broken.

The chief executive of one major bourse explained it to me like this: once upon a time, he said, 'the markets felt very comfortable … what was economically rational behaviour was often the politically rational choice to make. That is no longer the case'. Brexit, Trump, tariffs – each revealed

that politics now bends away from economics – just at the moment when the era of falling interest rates comes to an end. For three decades, cheap money has underpinned housing booms, private equity, and market exuberance. But now Washington is running vast fiscal deficits while enforcing tariffs. Warming to his theme, my Cassandra warned me that these were all ideas which 'will hurt productivity, will hurt margins and will hurt growth'.

Today, although America provides perhaps a fifth of global economic output, its stock market makes up three-quarters of the value of the world's equity investment in companies. Yet there is simply no iron law that America's dominance will last for ever. After all, the Japanese stock exchange once made up 40 per cent of global equity values. Today, it is 5 per cent. Capital flows can collapse overnight. But if that happens to the New York Stock Exchange, we risk an economic shock like that which followed the Wall Street crash: unemployment up, desperation up and extremists carried into office on a tidal wave of rage.

And this is not a moment in our history when we want populists controlling the levers of power, for the simple reason that too many bring their nasty habits to the table: an unholy trinity of appeasement, autocracy and avarice. To understand this better, I had to go back to school.

Appeasement, autocracy and avarice

St Antony's College, Oxford was founded in the uneasy peace after the Second World War and acquired a reputation as 'the spy college' – a place where soldiers, diplomats and scholars studied how the world worked and how it

might be remade. Le Carré even imagined one of George Smiley's agents as a former student. The myth endured because it carried a kernel of truth.

It was here, in 2025, that I took up a parliamentary fellowship and joined a Conservative colleague, John Glen – another former chief secretary to the Treasury – to convene a series of packed-out lectures on how to solve difficult problems in an age of polarisation. Over four months, what I heard from some of Britain's most experienced figures in security and intelligence, development and diplomacy was a warning: populist politics is dangerous in general. It is uniquely dangerous in the times in which we now find ourselves.

Appeasement?

'This is', ventured a former head of the Royal College of Defence Studies, 'a once-in-a-five-hundred-year moment.' The long hegemony of the West is giving way to a multipolar world in which China is not just a military rival but an administrative, industrial and demographic superpower. Comparing the dangers of today to the 1980s, a former head of the Secret Intelligence Service put it starkly: 'Back then we lived with the shadow of annihilation. Today the world is more even – America no longer dominates, China has risen, India is emerging, and Europe is in relative decline. That makes for greater competition, more manoeuvring and more disruption.'

Nuclear proliferation, once contained, now spreads. New technologies from AI to hypersonics are remaking the art and arsenal of power. The 'rules-based system' is

fraying into a messy, networked world where authoritarian leaders concentrate power, and kleptocrats manipulate connections that stretch across continents. And at the very moment allies look to Washington for steadiness, President Trump is radically recalibrating America's role in the multilateral system it built. It is not quite an 'Amexit', but it demands much more from the rest of us – not least in standing up to a Russia willing, like the Nazis in 1930s Spain, to seize land, terrorise civilians and bomb the infrastructure on which daily life depends.

Yet too often, we can find populists cosying up to Moscow. In November 2025, the former leader of Reform UK in Wales was sentenced to over a decade in jail after admitting taking bribes for pro-Russia interviews and speeches.

Worse, the populists' hunger for division is dangerous; they cannot build the unity at home or the alliances abroad that the times now require. Their divisive style corrodes the trust on which collective security depends. At home, our best defence is what is now known as a 'whole-of-society' approach – a Finnish-style unity of purpose in which a nation locks together to defend itself. As one former RAF leader remarked, 'The Finns can field 285,000 troops tonight. That's what national unity looks like.'

Abroad, a similar mindset is essential. As Professor Ngaire Woods reminded us, even when a hegemon like the United States steps back, smaller states can still forge institutions strong enough to restrain chaos – but only if partners trust that agreements will endure beyond a single election cycle. Populists shatter that trust. In their world of 'punch-you-in-the-face' deal-making, commitments snap, continuity dies and the ropes that bind old allies

together fray. So, unless we resist the populists' siren calls of tribalism, we risk being beaten without a shot fired, not least because populism is so expensive.

Autocracy – and its expense

The second great risk of populism is autocracy – and its economic cost. There are now enough populists in power for us to see the pattern clearly. The strongman sits at the heart of authoritarian populism, whether in Erdoğan's Turkey, Orbán's Hungary, Duterte's Philippines or Trump's America. Populism calls itself a people's crusade, yet in practice it is run by a narrow, jealous clique. Having divided a nation to gain office, they set about dividing its institutions to keep it: attacking the media, undermining elections, browbeating judges, intimidating civil servants, denigrating scientists and deriding constitutions, courts and international organisations as 'fake news', 'the deep state', 'a swamp' or 'a talking club'.

But when populists tear down the fences around executive power, they threaten what Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson call the Narrow Corridor[14] – the precious zone within which modern liberty evolved – the liberty that was so essential for modern economic growth. In that corridor, the state is strong enough to keep order, yet 'shackled' by norms, institutions and an active citizenry. Populists cut those shackles. They centralise power in the leader. And once those fetters break, the risks multiply: the most extreme danger is of a Weimar-style collapse of institutions; but a more common risk in the short run is economic damage, swift and severe.[15]

How severe? In an economic study of a century of 51 populist governments,[16] economists found that after 15 years of populist leadership, real GDP per head is more than 10 per cent lower. Populists buy applause on credit: a sugar-rush of giveaways financed by borrowing. Debts swell, inflation rises and, as judicial independence erodes and property rights weaken, investment withers. Autocratic leaders cannot resist meddling in the economy with such unpredictability that the confidence to take risks evaporates, and as Federal Reserve governor Lisa Cook once warned, uncertainty is a tax.

What would this mean for Britain? A lost fortune. A one-percentage-point growth penalty every year is devastating. It would mean almost £4,700 lost per person by the mid-2030s – around £22,000 per head over the decade. Autocracy economics is expensive. Populists promise prosperity. They deliver penury. Of course, not for themselves.

Avarice

The third tragedy of populism is avarice. Populists campaign on enriching the people, yet once in office they spend an extraordinary amount of time enriching themselves. Avarice puts its feet up on the desk. And the kleptosphere – that dark, sprawling zone of shell companies, hidden trusts and anonymous wealth – metastasises through a system we in the West helped to build: the Cayman Islands; the British Virgin Islands; the anonymous companies and secretive trusts. These were not inventions of Moscow or Beijing; they were invented in London and New York. And into these systems flow the spoils of stolen states.

Anne Applebaum, one of the world's leading experts on modern kleptocracy, has mapped this system in forensic detail. When I asked her how far populists had sunk, she was not short of examples.

Take Viktor Orbán, a leader alleged to have taken European money meant for his people and lent it to his friends. 'Orbán set up this system of stealing EU money,' she explained, 'diverting EU funding that went to companies close to him.' It was not an original model, Anne continued: 'he created the equivalent of the Russian oligarchs in Hungary. He just followed the same pattern.' A childhood neighbour, his son-in-law, his father – all were turned into businessmen by the stroke of state power and endowed with a network of companies, dependent on the government, that also just happened to control most of the country's media.

This is populism as a business model: a cartel stitched together by patronage and propaganda. And Hungary is not alone. Applebaum points to Poland's Law and Justice Party creating its own oligarchs; Austria's Freedom Party caught plotting to capture companies; French far-right leaders repeatedly indicted for misuse of public funds. The conclusion is inescapable. Populism may rage against elites but it feathers its own nests. It does not drain the swamp – it digs it deeper. Populist politics is too often not public service but plunder. Not democracy but deals without ideals.

History's warning

History is rich in warnings for today. The rhymes between our moment and the late 1920s are not hard to miss. By

1927, the West had survived the Great War, the Spanish flu and the ruinous inflation of the post-war years. What dawned was a golden day for some. Stock markets boomed, gilding fortunes for a lucky few. For millions more, new marvels – electrification, radio, motor cars – transformed daily life.

Yet behind the bright lights, darker currents stirred. It was, as historian Richard Overy observed, a 'morbid age', haunted by a 'presentiment of pending disaster', gripped by the fear that 'our way of life' was in mortal peril. Intellectuals drafted obituaries for capitalism. Eugenicists filled halls with talk of 'race suicide'. Millions marched to defend the League of Nations and plead for peace.[17]

Within two years the Wall Street crash ripped through Western economies. The Great Depression bit. Unemployment soared. Peace unravelled. And in the crisis, two nations took two very different paths. Economic catastrophe is the great accelerator of extremism. As historian Richard Evans has shown, Weimar Germany might have muddled through its chronic weaknesses. '[I]t would need a catastrophe of major dimensions,' he wrote, 'if an extremist party like the Nazis was to gain mass support. [But] in 1929, with the sudden collapse of the economy in the wake of the Stock Exchange crash in New York, it came.'[18]

By 1931, one in three German workers was unemployed. Young men drifted listlessly on Berlin's trains. The jobless and their dependents made up a fifth of the entire population. Families put off marriages and children. The Depression, Evans concludes, 'pushed [the Republic] beyond the point of no return'.[19] By 1933, the Nazis had taken office.

Reflecting on what the defenders of democracy got wrong, historian Christian Goeschel offered me a stark verdict. They 'should have been more courageous. They should have been so much more courageous in promoting the Weimar Republic.' Instead, timidity became systemic. 'They were basically tiptoeing. They thought, should we do this? Should we do that?' Robust defence of liberalism, he concluded, cannot be left to legal process or half-measures. It must be fought for boldly – or it will be lost.

I emphatically do not believe that we risk a repeat of the extremism of the 1930s, with all that followed. Not least because I believe we can learn from the alternative path created by a politician who showed how a crisis can be properly met: Franklin Roosevelt.

Renewing the radical centre

The purpose of this book is simple: to explain why populists are winning and to set out the beginnings of a project to beat them. At its heart is a single ambition – to reclaim and renew the radical centre of our politics. Not as a party label, but as a political, economic and moral project: realistic about money, radical about power, and rooted in the oldest democratic truth, that freedom grows as the bonds between us grow stronger, neighbour to neighbour and citizen to citizen. When cooperation is enlarged, so possibilities enlarge. When possibilities grow, so real freedom – our agency, options and opportunities - expands.

Renewing the radical centre begins with honesty. Not ignoring the anger that is obvious. Not soothing people with dull PowerPoints or denial. Renewal begins by

recognising that the deep forces driving populism – the disillusion, the division, the disruption – will grow stronger unless they are met with a project as bold as Roosevelt's New Deal.

Over the past year of research, interviews and polling across Britain and beyond, a project to conquer populism has emerged. It is the outlines of a Rooseveltian renewal: a new deal for the age of AI, algorithmic anger and democratic fatigue. In the chapters ahead, I set out that plan – how we build a heroic coalition of common sense, restore fairness, rebuild opportunity, renew belonging and create a state that performs with integrity and pride. Above all, it is a vision for how we revive a patriotism anchored not in exclusion but in our best ideals: decency, duty, fairness and freedom.

History offers us a blunt warning. In Weimar, democracy died when its defenders lost their nerve. In Roosevelt's America, it lived because they found their courage. If we do not fight to renew democracy, history shows what follows. If we fight with courage, history shows what's possible. Mainstream politics must recognise and ride the tide of anger that powers the populist rise, and rebuild the radical centre of Western liberalism. Mainstream leaders cannot take shelter from the storm. They must sail the tempest.