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See below for a selection of the latest books from Jurisprudence & philosophy of law category. Presented with a red border are the Jurisprudence & philosophy of law books that have been lovingly read and reviewed by the experts at Lovereading. With expert reading recommendations made by people with a passion for books and some unique features Lovereading will help you find great Jurisprudence & philosophy of law books and those from many more genres to read that will keep you inspired and entertained. And it's all free!
Ernst-Wolfgang Boeckenfoerde (b. 1930) is one of Europe's foremost legal scholars and political thinkers. As a scholar of constitutional law and a judge on Germany's Federal Constitutional Court (December 1983 - May 1996), Boeckenfoerde has been a major contributor to contemporary debates in legal and political theory, to the conceptual framework of the modern state and its presuppositions, and to contested political and ethical problems. Thus, his writings have shaped not only academic but also wider public debates from the 1950s to the present, to an extent that few European scholars can match. As a federal constitutional judge and holder of one the most important and most trusted public offices, Boeckenfoerde has influenced the way in which academics and citizens think about law and politics. During his tenure as a member of the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court, several path-breaking decisions for the Federal Republic of Germany were handed down, including decisions pertaining to the deployment of missiles, the law on political parties, the regulation of abortion, and the process of European integration. In the first representative edition in English of Boeckenfoerde's writings, this volume brings together his essays on constitutional and political theory. These include: political theory of the state; constitutional theory; constitutional norms and fundamental rights; the relationship between state, citizenship, and political autonomy. Each of these cornerstones of Boeckenfoerde's legal and political thinking feature introductions to the articles as well as a running editorial commentary to the work. A second volume will follow this collection, focusing on religion, law, and democracy.
Based on legal-philosophical research informed by insights gleaned from empirical case studies, this book sets out three central claims about integration requirements as conditions for attaining increased rights (ie family migration, permanent residency and citizenship) in Europe: (1) That the recent proliferation of these (mandatory) integration requirements is rooted in a shift towards 'individualised' conceptions of integration. (2) That this shift is, on the one side, counterproductive as it puts barriers to participation and inclusion of newcomers (who will most likely permanently settle) and on the other, normatively problematic, insofar as it produces status hierarchies between native-born and immigrant citizens. (3) That the remedy for this situation is a firewall that disconnects integration policy from access to rights. The book draws on perspectives on immigrant integration in multiple EU Member States and includes legal and political reactions to the refugee/migrant crisis.
The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct.
Taking Michel Foucault's genealogical analysis of power and resistance as its starting point, the book asks, from below, is there something in the very nature of law - that is, in its discursive and institutional dynamics, in its spatial, material, and temporal coordinates; in its own conceptual categories, claims, mechanisms, and processes - that makes it something more than the mere instrument and armature of power? If those in power can utilize the devices of law and justice to achieve political ends, isn't there something about these devices that can accommodate fresh articulations? Contending that there are, indeed, discursive, spatial, and temporal resources that can be reconfigured and redeployed as a counter-power and counter-discourse against sovereignty, the book takes as its focus the judicial apparatus; and, more specifically, the concept of the political or show trial. Examining the landmark political trials of Nelson Mandela, Marwan Barghouti, and Bobby Seale, the political trial, it is argued, evinces a crisis of law and sovereignty: a moment where the submerged crisis of sovereignty appears all across the normative structures of the system. The book thus considers the different ways in which a politics of resistance is enabled in the courtroom: as it uncovers a performative logic that contingently conditions, and thus breaks open, law's otherwise closed normativity.
This book seeks to reinstate the ethical subject at the heart of social and legal theory. It begins by making a case for the straightforward plausibility and enduring scientific usefulness of the tripartite model of the Soul and its nourishment found in Plato. It questions why this model has been abandoned, and shows how and why this ancient metaphysical conception is still required and might be defended in contemporary theoretical terms. The book argues that there are jurisprudential, sociological, moral and psychological resources available to recapture the opportunity to refashion with confidence a more intuitively fulfilling understanding of law, self and society.
1L of a Ride provides a candid, comprehensive roadmap to both academic and emotional success in law school's crucial first year.
Legal pluralism involves the coexistence of multiple forms of law. This involves state law, international law, transnational law, customary law, religious law, indigenous law, and the law of distinct ethnic or cultural communities. Legal pluralism is a subject of discussion today in legal anthropology, legal sociology, legal history, postcolonial legal studies, women's rights and human rights, comparative law, international law, transnational law, European Union law, jurisprudence, and law and development scholarship. A great deal of confusion and theoretical disagreement surrounds discussions of legal pluralism-which this book aims to clarify and help resolve. Drawing on historical and contemporary studies-including the Medieval period, the Ottoman Empire, postcolonial societies, Native peoples, Jewish and Islamic law, Western state legal systems, transnational law, as well as others-it shows that the dominant image of the state with a unified legal system exercising a monopoly over law is, and has always been, false and misleading. State legal systems are internally pluralistic in various ways and multiple manifestations of law coexist in every society. This book explains the underlying reasons for and sources of legal pluralism, identifies its various consequences, uncovers its conceptual and normative implications, and resolves current theoretical disputes in ways that are useful for social scientists, theorists, and law and development scholars and practitioners.
Law's Ideal Dimension provides a comprehensive account in English of renowned legal theorist Robert Alexy's understanding of jurisprudence, as expanded upon from his publications A Theory of Legal Argumentation (OUP 1989), A Theory of Constitutional Rights (OUP 1985), and The Argument from Injustice (OUP 1992). The collection is divided into three parts. Part One concerns the nature of law: it explores its real and ideal dimensions and how the ideal dimension of law is sometimes employed but does not play a systematically important role. Part Two discusses constitutional rights, human rights, and proportionality. It defends the construction of constitutional rights as principles against objections raised by the rule construction and elaborates on the nature of constitutional rights as well as the mathematical balancing of those rights. Part Three concerns the relation between argumentation, correctness, and law. The author concludes this volume with a biographical reflection.
Legal pluralism involves the coexistence of multiple forms of law. This involves state law, international law, transnational law, customary law, religious law, indigenous law, and the law of distinct ethnic or cultural communities. Legal pluralism is a subject of discussion today in legal anthropology, legal sociology, legal history, postcolonial legal studies, women's rights and human rights, comparative law, international law, transnational law, European Union law, jurisprudence, and law and development scholarship. A great deal of confusion and theoretical disagreement surrounds discussions of legal pluralism-which this book aims to clarify and help resolve. Drawing on historical and contemporary studies-including the Medieval period, the Ottoman Empire, postcolonial societies, Native peoples, Jewish and Islamic law, Western state legal systems, transnational law, as well as others-it shows that the dominant image of the state with a unified legal system exercising a monopoly over law is, and has always been, false and misleading. State legal systems are internally pluralistic in various ways and multiple manifestations of law coexist in every society. This book explains the underlying reasons for and sources of legal pluralism, identifies its various consequences, uncovers its conceptual and normative implications, and resolves current theoretical disputes in ways that are useful for social scientists, theorists, jurists, and law and development scholars and practitioners.
This book argues for a mixed theory of legal punishment that treats both crime reduction and retribution as important aims of the state. A central question in the philosophy of law is why the state's punishment of its own citizens is justified. Traditionally, two theories of punishment have dominated the field: consequentialism and retributivism. According to consequentialism, punishment is justified when it maximizes positive outcomes. According to retributivism, criminals should be punished because they deserve it. This book recognizes the strength of both positions. According to the two-tiered model, the institution of punishment and statutory penalties, as set by the legislature, are justified based on their costs and benefits, in terms of deterrence and rehabilitation. The law exists to preserve the public order. Criminal courts, by contrast, determine who is punished and how much based on what offenders deserve. The courts express the community's collective sense of resentment at being wronged. This book supports the two-tiered model by showing that it accords with our moral intuitions, commonly held (compatibilist) theories of freedom, and assumptions about how the extent of our knowledge affects our obligations. It engages classic and contemporary work in the philosophy of law and explains the theory's advantages over competing approaches from retributivists and other mixed theorists. The book also defends consequentialism against a longstanding objection that the social sciences give us little guidance regarding which policies to adopt. Drawing on recent criminological research, the two-tiered model can help us to address some of our most pressing social issues, including the death penalty, drug policy, and mass incarceration. This book will be of interest to philosophers, legal scholars, policymakers, and social scientists, especially criminologists, economists, and political scientists.
Is the government ever justified in restricting offensive speech? This question has become particularly important in relation to communications which offend religious sensibilities. It is often argued that insulting a person's beliefs is tantamount to disrespecting the believer; that insults are a form of hatred or intolerance; that the right to religious freedom includes a more specific right not to be insulted in one's beliefs; that religious minorities have a particularly strong claim to be protected from offence; and that censorship of offensive speech is necessary for the prevention of social disorder and violence. None of those arguments is convincing. Drawing on law and philosophy, this book argues that there is no moral right to be protected from offence and that, while freedom of religion is an important right that grounds negative and positive obligations for the state, it is unpersuasive to interpret constitutional and human rights provisions as including a right not to be caused offence. Rather, we have good reasons to think of public discourse as a space for the expression of all viewpoints about the ethical life, including those which some will find offensive. This is necessary to sustain a society's capacity for self-reflection and change.
From a legal-philosophical point of view, The Redress of Law presents a critical analysis of a number of related doctrinal fields: constitutional, labour and EU Law. Focusing on the organisation and protection of work, this book asks what it means to protect work as an essential aspect of human (individual and collective) flourishing. This is an ambitious and highly sophisticated intervention in contemporary academic and political debates around a set of critically important questions connected to processes of globalisation and market integration. The author redefines the nature of legal and political thought in an age in which market rationality has exceeded its classic domain and has come to pervade the organization of social and political life. This restatement of critical legal theory is intended to defend the concept of constitutionalism and suggest new ways to deploy the law strategically.