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See below for a selection of the latest books from Military tactics category. Presented with a red border are the Military tactics books that have been lovingly read and reviewed by the experts at Lovereading. With expert reading recommendations made by people with a passion for books and some unique features Lovereading will help you find great Military tactics books and those from many more genres to read that will keep you inspired and entertained. And it's all free!
Written in the 6th century BC, Sun Tzu's The Art of War is still used as a book of military strategy today. Napoleon, Mae Zedong, General Vo Nguyen Giap and General Douglas MacArthur all claimed to have drawn inspiration from it, and even beyond the world of war, business and management gurus have also applied Sun Tzu's ideas to office politics and corporate strategy. Using a new translation by James Trapp and including editorial notes, this edition of The Art of War is printed on high quality paper and bound by traditional Chinese book-making techniques. It contains the full 13 chapters on such topics as laying plans, attacking by stratagem, weaponry, terrain and the use of spies. Sun Tzu addresses different campaign situations, marching, energy and how to exploit your enemy's weaknesses. Of immense influence to great leaders across millennia, The Art of War is a classic text richly deserving this exquisite edition. About the Author James Trapp is the author of Chinese Characters: The Art and Meaning of Hanzi. A Chinese language graduate of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, he teaches Mandarin, is an Education Officer on the China Collection at the British Museum and worked for many years in Hong Kong as a dealer in Chinese art.
Winning World War II was about more than military force. It required guile, and tremendous acts of bravery by Special Forces and intelligence operatives who had the odds stacked against them. Using hundreds of documents and images from The National Archives, including some that have never been seen in print before, this book reveals some of World War II's most audacious missions. These include Operation Anthropoid, the plot to assassinate SS General Reinhard Heydrich in Czechoslovakia in 1942, Operation Chariot, the attempt to damage the mighty German warship Tirpitz while she was in dock in St-Nazaire in France; and Operation Mincemeat, a complex plot whereby a corpse, replete with documentation designed to mislead the enemy, was dropped in southern Spain to spread misinformation.
'An important book' SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE, FORMER DIRECTOR, MI6 'The Freakonomics of modern warfare' CONN IGGULDEN Everything you think you know about war is wrong. War is timeless. Some things change - weapons, tactics, leadership - but our desire to go into battle does not. We are in the midst of an age of conflict: global terrorism, Russia's resurgence and China's rise, international criminal empires, climate change and dwindling natural resources. The stakes are high, and we are dangerously unprepared. As a former paratrooper and military contractor, Sean McFate has been on the front lines of deep state conflicts. He has seen firsthand the horrors of battle and as a strategist, understands the complexity of the current military situation. The West is playing the same old war games, but the enemy has changed the rules. In this new age of war: -technology will not save us, -victory will belong to the cunning, not the strong, -plausible deniability is more potent than firepower -corporations, mercenaries, and rogue states have more power than nation states, and loyalty will sit with the highest bidder. Learn how to triumph in the coming age of conflict in ten new rules. Adapt and we can prevail. Fail, and size and strength won't protect us. This is The Art of War for the 21st century.
Military Adaptation in War addresses one of the most persistent problems that military organizations confront: namely, the problem of how to adapt under the trying, terrifying conditions of war. This work builds on the volume that Professor Williamson Murray edited with Allan Millett on military innovation (a quite different issue, though similar in some respects). In Clausewitzian terms, war is a contest, an interactive duel, which is of indeterminate length and presents a series of intractable problems at every level, from policy and strategy down to the tactical. Moreover, the fact that the enemy is adapting at the same time presents military organizations with an ever-changing set of conundrums that offer up no easy solutions. As the British general, James Wolfe, suggested before Quebec: 'War is an option of difficulties'. Dr Murray provides an in-depth analysis of the problems that military forces confront in adapting to these difficulties.
Strategic bombing is likely the most studied element in Aviation History. The shelves of libraries are filled with books on the topic, yet relatively little is known about where the concept originated or how it evolved. Most of the books on strategic bombing fall into three categories: descriptions of bombing campaigns, critiquing whether they succeeded, or describing why different nations pursued individual visions of airpower. While these are important analyses, there is no one complete study of the idea behind America's vision of strategy bombing that answers: how it originated, why it changed over time, the factors that shaped change, and how technology molded military doctrine? This book provides just such a full spectrum intellectual history of the American concept of strategic bombing. In the minds of forward thinking aerial theorists the new technology of the airplane removed the limitations of geography, defenses, and operational reach that had restricted ground and naval forces since the dawn of human conflict. With aviation, a nation could avoid costly traditional military campaigns and attack the industrial heart of an enemy using long-range bombers. Yet, the acceptance of strategic bombing doctrine proved a hard-fought process. The story of strategic bombing is not that of any one person or any one causal factor. Instead, it is a twisting tale of individual efforts, organizational infighting, political priorities, and most important technological integration. At no point was strategic bombing preordained or destined to succeed. In every era, the theory had to survive critical challenges. By tracing the complex interrelationships of these four causal factors, this book provides a greater understanding of the origins and rise to dominance of American strategic bombing theory. The Origins of American Strategic Bombing meets this need in two ways. First, it explains the intellectual process of going from Wright Flyers to B-17 formations over Germany. Next, it identifies the factors that shaped that intellectual development. In doing so, it challenges the Air Force's self-identity with a much more complex explanation. It is no longer the story of Billy Mitchell or The Bomber Mafia, but one of a complicated interweaving of events, people, organizational cultures, technology, and politics. The book is unique as it integrates military, political, cultural, and technological history to explain the rise of strategic bombing as the dominant American vision of airpower as it entered World War II.
Challenges longstanding myths about the nature of warfare in early America; A study of military tactics and strategy before the War of Independence, this book reexamines the conquest of the North American wilderness and its native peoples by colonial settlers. Historians have long believed that the peculiar conditions of the New World, coupled with the success of Indians tactics, forced the colonists to abandon traditional European methods of warfare and to develop a new American style of combat. By combining firearms with guerrilla-like native tactics, colonial commanders were able not only to subdue their Indian adversaries but eventually to prevail against more conventionally trained British forces during the American Revolution. Yet upon closer scrutiny, this common understanding of early American warfare turns out to be more myth than reality. As Guy Chet reveals, clashes between colonial and Indian forces during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not lead to a reevaluation and transformation of conventional military doctrine. On the contrary, the poor performance of the settlers during King Philip's War (1675-76) and King William's War (1689-1697) prompted colonial magistrates to address the shortcomings of their military forces through a greater reliance on British troops and imperial administrators. Thus, as the eighteenth century wore on, growing military success in the New England colonies reflected an increasing degree of British planning, administration, participation, and command. The colonies' military and political leadership, Chet argues, never rejected the time-tested principles of European warfare, and even during the American War of Independence, the republic's military leadership looked to Europe for guidance in the art of combat.
In an increasingly urbanized world, urban terrain has become a greater factor in military operations. Simultaneously, advances in military technology have given military forces sharply increased capabilities. The conflict comes from how urban terrain can negate or degrade many of those increased capabilities. What happens when advanced weapons are used in a close-range urban fight with an abundance of cover? Storming the City explores these issues by analyzing the performance of the US Army and US Marine Corps in urban combat in four major urban battles of the mid-twentieth century (Aachen 1944, Manila 1945, Seoul 1950, and Hue 1968). Alec Wahlman assesses each battle using a similar framework of capability categories, and separate chapters address urban warfare in American military thought. In the four battles, across a wide range of conditions, American forces were ultimately successful in capturing each city because of two factors: transferable competence and battlefield adaptation. The preparations US forces made for warfare writ large proved generally applicable to urban warfare. Battlefield adaptation, a strong suit of American forces, filled in where those overall preparations for combat needed fine tuning. From World War II to Vietnam, however, there was a gradual reduction in tactical performance in the four battles.
THE TIMES 100 BEST BOOKS FOR SUMMER 'AN IMPORTANT BOOK' Sir Richard Dearlove, Former Director of MI6 'The Freakonomics of modern warfare' Conn Iggulden Everything you think you know about war is wrong. The rules have changed, and we are dangerously unprepared. In Goliath, former paratrooper and Professor of Strategy Sean McFate teaches us the ten new rules of war for today. __________ War is timeless. Some things change - weapons, tactics, leadership - but our desire to go into battle does not. We are living in an age of conflict: global terrorism, Russia's resurgence and China's rise, international criminal empires, climate change and dwindling natural resources. But while the West has been playing the same old war games, the enemy has changed the rules. Sean McFate has been on the front lines of conflict. He has seen first-hand the horrors of battle, and as a strategist, he understands the complexity of the current military situation. In this new age of war: - Technology will not save us - Victory will belong to the cunning, not the strong - Plausible deniability is more potent than firepower - New types of world powers will rule Learn how to triumph in the coming age of conflict in ten new rules. Adapt and we can prevail. Fail, and size and strength won't protect us. This is The Art of War for the 21st century. __________ 'Some of what he says makes more sense than much of what comes out of the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defence' Max Hastings, Sunday Times 'Thought-provoking' Johnathon Evans, Former Head of MI5 'Fascinating and disturbing' Economist
HarperCollins is proud to present its incredible range of best-loved, essential classics. The ancient Chinese art of warfare written by military strategist Sun Tzu in the 5th century BC.
A delightfully illustrated version of Sunzi's classic The Art of War by bestselling cartoonist C. C. Tsai C. C. Tsai is one of Asia's most popular cartoonists, and his editions of the Chinese classics have sold more than 40 million copies in over twenty languages. This volume presents Tsai's delightful graphic adaptation of Sunzi's Art of War, the most profound book on warfare and strategy ever written--a work that continues to be read as a handbook for success not just by military commanders but also by leaders in politics, business, and many other fields. Conceived by a Chinese warrior-philosopher some 2,500 years ago, The Art of War speaks to those aspiring to rise through the ranks and help build successful countries. How can that goal best be achieved, and what is the role of warfare, if any, in the process? What are the powers and limits of the general in command? How can you win without going to war? Sunzi's answers to these and other questions are brought to life as never before by Tsai's brilliant cartoons, which show Sunzi fighting on dangerous ground, launching a surprise attack, spying on his enemies, and much more. A marvelously rich introduction to a timeless classic, this book also features a foreword by Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading authorities on military strategy, which illuminates how The Art of War has influenced Western strategic thought. In addition, Sunzi's original Chinese text is artfully presented in narrow sidebars on each page, enriching the books for readers and students of Chinese without distracting from the self-contained English-language cartoons. The text is skillfully translated by Brian Bruya, who also provides an introduction.
The United States has the most expensive and seemingly military forces in the world. Yet, since World War II its military success rate has been fairly meager. The Korean War was a draw, Vietnam, Mogadishu, Afghanistan and Iraq were clear losses. Successes include: Iraq in 1991, the Balkans (Croatia and Kosovo), Panama, the initial takedowns of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and Libya. Failures have been marked by the introduction of large numbers of conventional American ground troops, while successes have been characterized by the use of airpower, special operations forces, robust intelligence and sensor platforms, and the use of indigenous ground troops. The vital interests of the United States are seldom at stake; instead, the US intervenes to punish aggressors or topple particularly inhumane dictators. As a result, the US and its allies strive to maintain public support, both at home and abroad. One of the surest ways to lose this support is to suffer high casualties or, worse, inflict them on the societies we are ostensibly attempting to help. The goal of limiting cost and casualties is hindered by the introduction of large numbers of conventional ground troops-especially in the xenophobic societies of the Middle East. This desire to limit risk and cost, while still achieving definable political goals, results in a quandary. This is not a new problem, and as early as two millennia ago nations sought to achieve these dual and often contradictory goals against enemies with asymmetric strengths. Often, nations rejected taking on a powerful enemy head-to-head; instead, belligerents launched second front operations -they moved the war elsewhere to achieve local superiority. Not surprisingly, this strategy was especially appealing to nations possessing powerful navies. Britain, who controlled the seas for several centuries, was especially adept at using this second front strategy. Today we find that although second fronts may not be necessary, the reasons for conducting such operations are still with us-the desire to limit risk while achieving measurable goals. For America that means eschewing the use of massive numbers of ground troops to invade and occupy a subject country, but instead using its asymmetric strengths-a combination of airpower, SOF, intelligence and indigenous ground troops to achieve political goals.
Since the end of World War II, America lost every war it started and failed in military interventions when it did not use sound strategic thinking or have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the circumstances in deciding to use force. The public and politicians need to understand why we have often failed in using military force and the causes. From that understanding, hopefully future administrations will be better prepared when considering the most vexing decision to employ force and send Americans into battle. The twin causes have been the failure to think strategically and to have sufficient knowledge and understanding when deciding on the use of force. Interestingly, this failure applies to republicans and democrats alike and seems inherent in our national DNA as we continue ignore past mistakes. By examining the records of presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama in using force or starting wars, it becomes self-evident why we fail. And the argument is reinforced by autobiographical vignettes that provide a human dimension and insight into the reasons for failure, in some cases making public previously unknown history. The recommendations and solutions offered in Anatomy of Failure begin with a framework for a brains based approach to strategic thinking and then address specific bureaucratic, political, organizational and cultural deficiencies have reinforced this propensity for failure. The clarion call of the book is that both a sound strategic framework and sufficient knowledge and understanding of the circumstance that may lead to using force are vital. Without them, failure is virtually guaranteed.