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See below for a selection of the latest books from Theory of warfare & military science category. Presented with a red border are the Theory of warfare & military science books that have been lovingly read and reviewed by the experts at Lovereading. With expert reading recommendations made by people with a passion for books and some unique features Lovereading will help you find great Theory of warfare & military science books and those from many more genres to read that will keep you inspired and entertained. And it's all free!
There is growing alarm over how drugs empower terrorists, insurgents, militias, and gangs. But by looking back not just years and decades but centuries, Peter Andreas reveals that the drugs-conflict nexus is actually an old story, and that powerful states have been its biggest beneficiaries. In his path-breaking Killer High, Andreas shows how six psychoactive drugs-ranging from old to relatively new, mild to potent, licit to illicit, natural to synthetic-have proven to be particularly important war ingredients. This sweeping history tells the story of war from antiquity to the modern age through the lens of alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, opium, amphetamines, and cocaine. Beer and wine drenched ancient and medieval battlefields, and the distilling revolution lubricated the conquest and ethnic cleansing of the New World. Tobacco became globalized through soldiering, with soldiers hooked on smoking and governments hooked on taxing it. Caffeine and opium fueled imperial expansion and warfare. The commercialization of amphetamines in the twentieth century energized soldiers to fight harder, longer, and faster, while cocaine stimulated an increasingly militarized drug war that produced casualty numbers surpassing most civil wars. As Andreas demonstrates, armed conflict has become progressively more drugged with the introduction, mass production, and global spread of mind-altering substances. As a result, we cannot understand the history of war without including drugs, and we similarly cannot understand the history of drugs without including war. From ancient brews and battles to meth and modern warfare, drugs and war have grown up together and become addicted to each other.
Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote that 'War is the continuation of politics by other means'. But what does Clausewitz mean to a world where economic, political and cultural conflicts are increasingly framed as wars?Written after the Napoleonic Wars but left unfinished at the author's death and not published until 1832, On War is one of the most influential and important works on military strategy ever written. This new edition presents this classic text with a new introduction by Graham Harman, who reads Clausewitz's ideas about war, politics and military strategy through the lens of speculative realism.
When Conrad Crane retired from active duty to become a research professor,he never expected to become a modern Cassandra, fated to tell truth to powerwithout being heeded. After the world transformed on 9/11, he warned theArmy that it was not prepared to execute stability operations,counterinsurgency, and the eventual reconstruction of Iraq. Crane's work attracted the attention of Generals David Petraeus and JamesMattis, and he soon found himself in charge of a team tasked with creatingthe groundbreaking Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5Counterinsurgency, the very counterinsurgency doctrine he had pleaded for. Aunique blend of traditional and modern theory, this manual would prove to beessential to the success of the Surge in Iraq that changed the course of thewar. Crane's account of the creation and implementation of the manual addressesits many criticisms, details what went wrong in Iraq, and explains how the newdoctrine was never properly applied in Afghanistan. From the debates over thecontent to the ways it was used in the field, Cassandra in Oz covers lessons that should be gleaned fromyears of global war and displays the American military as a learningorganization at its best.
The first edition of The Morality of War was one of the most widely-read and successful books ever written on the topic. In this second edition, Brian Orend builds on the substantial strengths of the first, adding important new material on: cyber-warfare; drone attacks; the wrap-up of Iraq and Afghanistan; conflicts in Libya and Syria; and protracted struggles (like the Arab-Israeli conflict). Updated and streamlined throughout, the book offers new research tools and case studies, while keeping the winning blend of theory and history featured in the first edition. This book remains an engaging and comprehensive examination of the ethics, and practice, of war and peace in today's world.
Truppenfuehrung, the 20th-century equivalent of Sun Tzu's Art of War , served as the basic manual for the German army from 1934 to the end of World War II. This document provided the doctrinal framework for blitzkrieg and, as a consequence, for the victories of Hitler's armies. Rather than giving German military leaders a cookbook on how to win battles, the manual offered instead a set of intellectual tools to be applied to complex and continually changing battle conditions. The keys to understanding the psychology, philosophy and social values of the German army that fought World War II are to be found here. This English-language translation is annotated to help the reader understand its military and social context.
Information has always played a decisive role in wining wars but it is only in past two decades that it has transformed into a distinct battlespace akin to land, sea and air. Information Warfare (IW) is the new type of war waged in this battlespace. Shaping perceptions through social media, relentless cyber operations by nation statesand non state actors,the race to dominate electromagnetic spectrumare all part of this new warfare whose aim is to dominate the information landscape. The ability of IW operations to quickly undermine national sovereignty and inflict crippling damage to strategic interests is now an undeniable reality. Surprisingly, despite the exponentially increasing role of IW, it has not been easy to transform this new capability into operational doctrine and corresponding force structures. The recent elevation of the United States Cyber Command and China's Strategic Support Force signify the first major steps towards creating a dedicated force structure for conduct of IW operations. It is a reality which every modern armed force must confront sooner or later. This book attempts to lay down a theoretical framework to evolve operational doctrine and force structures for conduct of IW as well as their integration with conventional kinetic operations.
The Long Road analyses the ADF's `train, advise, assist'missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea,Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, South Vietnam andUganda. With contributions from media commentatorsChris Masters and Ian McPhedran, politicians KevinAndrews and David Feeney, academics, aid workersand military personnel, The Long Road evaluates thesuccesses and failures of Australia's efforts to help itsneighbours and partners avoid armed conflict.
Based on a MOOC (Massive Open Online Course) designed for both military personnel and non-specialists across the globe, Key Concepts in Military Ethics is structured as a series of `mini-chapters' that cover a huge range of topics and issues: moral dilemmas, military and civilian interactions, freedom of the press, peacekeeping, terrorism and humanitarian intervention. Written by a team of academic experts, many with military experience, the book contains scenarios and case studies, including the Gulf War, the Falklands War, `Ground Zero' in New York City and more conventional theatres of war through history, as well as cyber-terrorism, the role of military contractors and unmanned weapons systems.
For nearly two centuries, On War, by Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831), has been the bible for statesmen and military professionals, strategists, theorists, and historians concerned about armed conflict. The source of the famous aphorism that war is an extension of politics by other means, it has been widely read and debated. But, as Jon Sumida shows in this daring new look at Clausewitz's magnum opus, its full meaning has eluded most readers-until now. Approaching Clausewitz's classic as if it were an encoded text, Sumida deciphers this cryptic masterwork and offers a more productive way of looking at the sources and evolution of its author's thought. Sumida argues that On War should be viewed as far more complete and coherent than has been supposed. Moreover, he challenges the notion that On War is an attempt to explain the nature of armed conflict through the formulation of abstract theories. Clausewitz's primary concern, Sumida contends, was practical instruction of the military and political leadership of his country. To achieve this end, Clausewitz invented a method of reenacting the psychological difficulties of high command in order to promote the powers of intuition that he believed were essential to effective strategic decision-making. In addition, Sumida argues that Clausewitz's primary strategic proposition is that the defense is a stronger form of war than the offense. This concept, Sumida maintains, must be understood in order to make sense of Clausewitz's positions on absolute and real war, guerrilla warfare, and the relationship of war and policy/politics. Sumida's pathbreaking critique is supported by examination of the Prussian officer's experience during the Napoleonic Wars, previous major theoretical and historical scholarship on Clausewitz and his writing, and modern philosophical and scientific works that have much in common with Clausewitz's creative guide to the consideration of strategic practice. A major study of intellectual and military history, Sumida's book provides a provocative and above all readily comprehensible treatment of a previously inaccessible classic. It will surely become essential reading for all military professionals and serious students of military thought.
Wars and conflicts have become a near constant presence today, brought to us on a real-time basis on myriad communication devices. A cursory scan of recent conflicts reveals the blurring lines between war and peace, state versus non-state, regular and irregular, and conventional vis-a-vis unconventional. Over the past decade or so, the prevailing security environment in many regions has changed radically. Simultaneously the probability of conventional conflict between states or groups of states has steadily declined while sub-conventional conflict has gained prominence. These small, niggling wars have been termed as hybrid, non-linear, grey zone, or unrestricted, among others. It thus becomes necessary to enquire ontologically and epistemologically into these terms to understand if they allude to the same phenomenon through different frames. Furthermore, are these an aberration or, increasingly, the convention? This book tries to address this crucial research gap related to the changing character of conflicts in the strategic discourse in India.
It is axiomatic that in a democracy, the nation's Armed Forces are subordinate to its elected Government. But a Nation's Armed Forces are `Forces' that exude and represent national power and areno ordinary subordinate agencies. Besides, they are unique organizations with long and proud traditions. Control of the armed Forces is hence an arduously complex and delicate function requiring comprehensive and more importantly, a mature understanding of the Forces; ethos and internal mechanisms of operation. No universally accepted templates exist for how this control must be exercised and each nation evolves a model best suited to its own polity, geography and geo-strategic environment. A cardinal dimension underlying the entire control regime remains the capacity of its economy to allocate fiscal resources towards ensuring its security. The primary structures of control of India's Armed Forces evolved under the British Rule. The course of evolution of these structures from the days of the East India Company and the Raj, their adaptation to conform to the requirements of a democracy, post-independence developments and the course this process needs to take to meet future requirements are some of the fascinating aspects of an absorbing subject this book attempts to explore.
Bringing about change in any setup, especially major shifts, is a challenge. This challenge is accentuated further in a strictly hierarchical organisation like the army, presenting an unenviable contradiction to both senior military practitioners and the governing elite, wherein, change is inevitable, yet, it is most likely to be resisted. Military change is a relatively nascent area of study, especially in the Indian scenario. This book attempts to analyse this subject through an examination of existing literature, thereby co-relating some of its primary conclusions in the context of the Indian Army. This is done in relation to both conventional and sub-conventional threats and challenges, with a number of case studies as illustrative examples. The book concludes that given the wide spectrum of threats faced by the Indian Army, as also most major armies across the world, attempts at understanding military change only through the prism of conventional wars could be misleading. It suggests that change need not only be revolutionary to enhance effectiveness. It could be both revolutionary and evolutionary, top-down and bottom-up. While effective change is primarily major in conventional conditions, it could well be tactical and yet make a substantial impact in sub-conventional scenarios. The book reinforces the importance of operational changes in the sub-conventional domain, even as an assessment of strategic and organisational changes is undertaken. It attempts to answer important questions related to the drivers, shapers, facilitating conditions and limitations related to effective change. It also relates military change with organisational changes in the corporate world to provide an interesting comparative analysis. Finally, the book reinforces its conclusions through a survey of officers from the Indian Army, to highlight existing limitations that need to be corrected in order to better innovate and adapt in pursuit of effective military change.