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See below for a selection of the latest books from Philosophy: metaphysics & ontology category. Presented with a red border are the Philosophy: metaphysics & ontology books that have been lovingly read and reviewed by the experts at Lovereading. With expert reading recommendations made by people with a passion for books and some unique features Lovereading will help you find great Philosophy: metaphysics & ontology books and those from many more genres to read that will keep you inspired and entertained. And it's all free!
Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection alone. Sven Rosenkranz conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing and of being in a position to know. His account contrasts with recent alternative views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. Instead, he develops a suitable non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts. He also defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification and its varying degrees of strength that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states.
This is the first volume of essays devoted to Aristotelian formal causation and its relevance for contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science. The essays trace the historical development of formal causation and demonstrate its relevance for contemporary issues, such as causation, explanation, laws of nature, functions, essence, modality, and metaphysical grounding. The book begins with a group of essays that develop and criticise various contemporary approaches to formal causation. Part II takes on modal issues that have been closely connected with form and essence. In Part III, the essays explore issues from biology, including form, essentialism, and evolutionary development biology. The fourth and final set of chapters discusses the relevance of formal causation for reasoning, specifically concerning accounts of logical consequence and developmental psychology. Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Formal Causation will be of interest to advanced graduate students and researchers working on contemporary Aristotelian approaches to metaphysics and philosophy of science.
The world, according to Kant, is made up of two levels of reality: the transcendental and the empirical. The transcendental level is a mind-independent level at which things in themselves exist. The empirical level is a fully mind-dependent level at which appearances exist, which are intentional objects of experience. The distinction between appearances and things in themselves lies at the heart of Kant's critical philosophy and has been the focus of fierce debate among scholars for over two hundred years. Anja Jauernig offers this interpretation of Kant's critical idealism as an ontological position, which comprises transcendental idealism, empirical realism, and a number of other basic ontological theses, as developed in the Critique of Pure Reason and associated texts. In this interpretation Kant is a genuine idealist about empirical objects, empirical minds, and space and time. Yet in contrast to other intentional objects, appearances genuinely exist, which is due to both the special character of experience compared to other kinds of representations such as illusions or dreams, and to the grounding of appearances in things themselves. This is why Kant can also be considered a genuine realist about empirical objects, empirical minds, and space and time. This book spells out Kant's case for critical idealism thus understood, pinpoints the differences between critical idealism and ordinary idealism, and clarifies the relation between Kant's conception of things in themselves and the conception of things in themselves by other philosophers, in particular Kant's Leibniz-Wolffian predecessors.
This book offers a new materialist thesis that focuses on the dynamic biological core of humans, shared with other animals and the rest of the natural world, to develop a radical theory of human rights. It therefore makes a unique contribution to literature and to academic and societal debates both on new materialisms and on human rights. Many on the political far right deride the concept of a human right. This has occurred in tandem with a growing contempt for the rule of law and for obligations to protect land or the environment, to recognize the rights of minorities, or even to respect the various mechanisms of democracy. On the other hand, ccontemporary 'left-wing' inspired literature has also rejected the concept of a human right as Enlightenment inspired and 'western'. This has gone hand in hand with a contestation of 'essentialism' and 'universalism'. These theoretical positions have been variously critiqued as racist, sexist as well as Eurocentric. Drawing on metaphysics and ethics, with protagonists drawn from traditions across analytic and continental philosophy and feminist theory, Assiter challenges these critics to form a distinctive new materialist position. Most people - defenders and critics - take for granted that the concept of human rights and the universal view of humanity derive from the European Enlightenment. However, this book develops a different story of its origin, from the earlier period of both Aristotle and the Zoroastrian Persian Empire, and locates the concept of a right partly in our biological core, yet challenges the assumption that this is constructed by language of any kind specifically including scientific discourse.
This volume presents a new view of the relationship between metaphysics and the theory of meaning. What is the relation between the nature of the things you think about, on the one hand, and the ways you think about them on the other? Is the nature of the world prior to the nature of thought and meaning, or not? Christopher Peacocke argues that the nature of the world - its metaphysics - is always involved in thought and meaning. Meaning is never prior to the nature of the world. Peacocke develops a general claim that metaphysics is always involved, either as explanatorily prior, or in a no-priority relationship, to the theory of meaning and content. Meaning and intentional content are never explanatorily prior to the metaphysics. He aims to show, in successive chapters of The Primacy of Metaphysics how the general view holds for magnitudes, time, the self, and abstract objects. For each of these cases, the metaphysics of the entities involved is explanatorily prior to an account of the nature of our language and thought about them. Peacocke makes original contributions to the metaphysics of these topics, and offers consequential new treatments of analogue computation and representation. In the final chapter, he argues that his approach generates a new account of the limits of intelligibility, and locates his account in relation to other treatments of this classical conundrum.
This monograph bridges two discourses that so far have remained largely separate: debates about how and why secular modernity emerged, and Reformation studies. In telling the history of secularity, scholars have often focussed on late medieval shifts concerning the God-world-relationship (metaphysics). But how does the Reformation fit into this history? This book answers this question by investigating the implied metaphysics of the Reformation. To do so, it first proposes a new approach for studying the God-world-relationship in works which are not explicitly metaphysical, which is the case for most Reformation sources. Secondly, it applies this methodology to the work of one lesser known, but important reformer, Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499 - 1562), concluding that his work simultaneously inhabits two different models of understanding the God-world-relationship. The book concludes by highlighting the significance of this finding for understanding the Reformation and its place in the history of secularity.
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question. (More specifically, Mark Balaguer argues that there's no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects-or material objects of any other kind.) Second, Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into some subquestions-call them Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.-such that, for each of these subquestions, one of the following three anti-metaphysical views is true of it: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. These three views can be defined (very roughly) as follows: non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there's no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some contingent aspect of physical reality, and Q can't be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that's metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn't say anything about reality and, if it's true, isn't made true by reality