Tell us a story

LoveReading is thrilled to announce the launch of The Very Short Story Award 2019! If you think you have a story we'll love, click here to find out more and how to enter:

Find out more

Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity

by Gilbert Harman, Judith Thomson

Part of the Great Debates in Philosophy Series

Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity Synopsis

Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost. Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.

Book Information

ISBN: 9780631192114
Publication date: 25th November 1995
Author: Gilbert Harman, Judith Thomson
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers an imprint of John Wiley and Sons Ltd
Format: Paperback / softback
Pagination: 240 pages
Categories: Ethics & moral philosophy,

About Gilbert Harman, Judith Thomson

Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Princeton. His publications include Thought (1973), The Nature of Morality (1977), and Change in View (1986). Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her publications include The Realm of Rights (1990), and Rights, Restitution and Risk (1986).

More About Gilbert Harman, Judith Thomson

Share this book